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Scenarios for the Financial Redistribution across Member States in the European Union in 2007-2013
  by Sándor Richter
wiiw Research Reports, No. 317, April 2005
 
Summary
A strikingly unique and particularly important feature of EU integration is the redistribution of resources across member states. This has grown from a nearly negligible level in the early stages of the European integration to its present modest volume (approximately 1% of the Union's GNI). Redistribution of resources across member states has been gaining in significance as new relatively poor member states join the enlargement process. After the 2004 enlargement, differences in the member states' level of economic development increased significantly. Measured in terms of average per capita GNI in PPS, twelve member states are now above the EU-25 average. Thirteen member states' development levels range between the EU-25 average and less than half of that. With the accession of Bulgaria and Rumania in 2007 the lower end will be 34-35% of the then EU-27.
 
Redistribution across member states in the EU is designed in multi-annual financial frameworks. The full weight of enlargement-related challenges will appear in the financial perspectives for 2007-2013. Scenarios made by independent research groups prior to the February 2004 publication of the European Commission's proposal for the financial perspectives 2007-2013 reckoned with a range of options, including radical reforms focused on agricultural and cohesion expenditures. With the publication of the Commission's proposal the focus of discussions shifted to the size of the EU budget.
 
The Commission proposes an EU budget which amounts to 1.26% of the EU GNI in commitment appropriations (that corresponds to 1.14% in payments appropriations). The six major net payer member states insist on a smaller EU budget: it should not exceed 1% of the EU GNI in commitment terms (about 0.9% in payments). The debate on the next financial perspective takes place against the backdrop of commitment appropriations. In that context, the Commission's proposal for the total envisaged expenditures for seven years equals to EUR 1025 billion, while the major net payers require 20.5% less expenditures, EUR 815 billion for the same period. In the Commission's proposal, expenditures were to grow annually by 4%; in 2013 they would be 31.3% higher than in 2006. In the six major net payers' version the annual growth in expenditures would only be 0.6% and the compound growth rate for 2013/2006 would amount to 4.4% only. The EU-27 GNI is estimated to grow by 17.3% over the seven-year period concerned: an annual growth rate of 2.3% (all data at constant prices).
 
In this paper three moderate and two radical reform scenarios for the redistribution across member states in 2007-2013 are introduced. The scenarios reflect the ongoing discussions on the size of the future EU budget, possible net financial positions of the member states, efficiency of EU transfers and finally directions of earlier reform proposals.
 
The first scenario is identical to the European Commission's proposal. It represents a partial departure from the spending structure of the current (2000-2006) financial perspective. The newly created expenditure sub-heading Competitiveness is a resolute step towards an upgrading of programmes with 'European value-added' and establishes, with other, smaller classes of expenditures, a third major pillar of spending beside Agriculture and Cohesion. Another important new element is the introduction of a general correction mechanism to address the problem of excessive negative net financial positions.
 
The second scenario stands for the proposal of the major net payer countries and reckons with a 1% of EU GNI (commitments) budget. Here, just as in all further scenarios, direct payments for farmers and market intervention and administrative costs are exempted from reductions, as CAP-related spending is compulsory while administration costs are regarded as too rigid to be reduced. The burden of reduction (close to one third on average) is therefore borne, to an equal extent, by all other expenditures.
 
The third scenario is, what concerns the size of the EU budget, a compromise 'at halfway' between the Commission's and the six major net payer member states' proposals. The expenditure structure is similar to that in the first and second scenarios.
 
The fourth and fifth scenarios represent radical reforms. Both are based on the assumption that the major net payer countries will succeed in reducing the EU budget to 1% of the EU GNI (commitments). It is further assumed that a smaller budget must set priorities, the practice of 'something for everyone' cannot be continued any longer. With picking up only one of the two leading motives for the redistribution across member states in the EU, providing 'EU-wide value-added' or enhancing cohesion (catching-up of less developed regions and member states), respectively, these scenarios operate with a radically re drawn expenditure structure.
 
The fourth scenario, labelled 'More competitiveness', leaves expenditures for providing 'EU-wide value-added' unchanged as they figure in the Commission's original proposal. The requisite cuts to come down to a '1% budget' are made in the expenditures earmarked in the Commission's proposal for cohesion. In the fifth scenario, labelled 'More cohesion', the cohesion-related expenditures of the Commission's proposal are left unchanged and the expenditures for providing 'EU-wide value-added' are reduced.
 
In the scenario 'More competitiveness', while the programmes supporting the provision of EU-wide value-added can be implemented to full extent, projects enhancing catching-up will have to be reduced to hardly more than one third of that proposed by the Commission. The cuts in cohesion-related programmes will amount to EUR 27 billion in 2007 and EUR 42 billion in 2013. In 2013 expenditures on cohesion will amount to less than half the respective amount in 2006, the year preceding the accession of Bulgaria and Romania.
 
In the scenario 'More cohesion', emphasis is placed on redistribution favouring the less developed member states and regions. Unchanged expenditures (including, as in all scenarios, CAP-related and administration items), make up nearly 80% of the total envisaged for 2007 in the Commission's original proposal. This means that the remaining 20% will have to bear the brunt of the cutbacks in total expenditures so as to comply with the 1% GNI ceiling. The breakdown of expenditures by policy area clearly shows that in the first year of the new financial perspective, the policy areas affected by cuts are practically annihilated. After 2007, the situation slowly changes as the relative weight of direct payments to farmers and transfers for cohesion decreases and that for provision of 'EU wide value-added' increases. The rate of reduction in expenditures for the latter group, compared to the Commission's proposal, drops from 92% in 2008 to 68% by 2013.
 
With per capita GNI well below the EU average, the most important issue for the new member states is how much additional funding will be available to them for catching up via cohesion transfers. The Commission's intention is that cohesion-related transfers are distributed approximately in the proportion 50:50 between new and old member states, respectively.
 
In the first and fifth scenarios (Commission's proposal, 'More cohesion') where funds for cohesion correspond to those proposed by the Commission, the eight less developed new members are able to draw cohesion transfers annually up to 4% of their GDP, Malta and the Czech Republic up to 3%, Cyprus and Slovenia up to 2% of their GDP. In the second scenario (1% budget, unchanged expenditure structure), even if the relatively more developed new members Cyprus, Slovenia, Malta and the Czech Republic received transfers equalling to only 2% of their GDP, and all other new members 3%, old EU members should fall back upon about one quarter (at the beginning of the period) to less than 10% of the total cohesion transfers (end of the period), instead of about 50% as earmarked in the Commission's proposal. The really bad news for new members, however, would be the realization of the fourth scenario 'More competitiveness', which would leave cohesion transfers for the four more developed new members amounting only to 1% of their GDP and only 2% of the GDP for all other, less developed, new members. Even in this fairly meagre edition of cohesion policy for new members, the share of old members would only amount to about one third of the total instead of one half as proposed by the Commission.
 
The radical reform scenarios would lead to significant shifts in the net positions of the member states, but an exact assessment of the changes by individual member states is as yet impossible. This leads to the conclusion that the general correction mechanism proposed by the Commission or even a different mechanism with an outcome of diminished variation in net financial positions by member state is an important prerequisite for any major reform of the redistribution across member states in the EU. The mere fact that no excessive deficits may emerge as a consequence of relatively unpredictable effects should encourage the most developed EU member states to adopt a more open attitude towards changes of all kinds concerning the EU budget.
 
The paper discusses the main features of the position of five member states (Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Austria and Germany) concerning selected issues of the next financial perspectives. In the search for a compromise on the size of the next EU budget, Germany's position is of paramount importance. The Stability and Growth Pact prescribes the observance of a maximum 3% budget deficit/GDP ratio in any member state. Featuring as the main financial pillar of the EU budget, Germany has been struggling with its own excessive deficit for years, while its net financial contribution to the EU budget amounted to more than 0.5% of its GNP in 1997-2000 and 0.38% of its GNP/GNI in 2001-2003. The recently proposed relaxation of the Stability and Growth Pact rules may offer remedy to the troubled relationship of the EU and German budgets.
 
Although the discussion on the 2007-2013 financial perspective may be concluded as early as June 2005, the possibility of the negotiations not reaching a decisive stage until the first half of 2006 cannot be excluded. This means that the first evaluation of the new members' record in the absorption of EU transfers may play an important role in the final stage of negotiations on the future budget. If the experience is overwhelmingly positive or at least acceptable in most of the new member states, no additional element will enter the discussion. However, should it transpire that all or most of the new members have encountered serious difficulties in drawing down available resources from the EU budget and are thus far behind their own projections for absorption, the discussion on the new financial perspective might take a decisive turn for the worse, from the new member states' point of view. Those calling for a smaller budget and/or less spending on cohesion would receive important arguments for the discussion.
 
The main conclusion of the paper is that in case the six major net payer member states succeed in getting the EU budget cut to 1% of the EU GNI, the consequences will be considerable, unless expenditures for cohesion are declared exempt from the cuts. It would be practically impossible to strike a compromise without seriously frustrating one of the two groups (old and new members). As the approval of a budget calls for unanimity, this may well lead to a serious crisis in the Union over the next two years.
 
Keywords: European integration, EU, redistribution across member states, scenarios, cohesion, competitiveness, budgetary reforms, EU financial perspective, EU budget, own resources and expenditures, net financial position

JEL classification: F15, F36, F47, H29, H49, H77, H87, R11
 
 

 
 


 
 


 
 


 
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